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SIXTEEN YEARS OF LITIGATION UNDER THE ARKANSAS CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT: WHERE WE HAVE BEEN AND WHERE WE ARE
GOING
Michael Mosley, Robert Beard, and Paul Charton*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 (hereinafter the ACRA or the
Act) is the state mechanism that provides an individual a means to redress
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Ar-
kansas Constitution.1 In 1991, civil rights legislation intended to partially
follow the federal Civil Rights Act of 1871 was introduced in the state's
legislature and was approved by the Senate.2 The provisions of the ACRA
largely mirror federal and civil rights statutes that preceded it, with certain
deviations discussed in this article. Some of the federal corollaries to the
ACRA include, 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (commonly known as section 1983),
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (commonly known as Title VII),
and the Americans with Disabilities Act. In effect, the ACRA allows liti-
gants and attorneys an alternative forum to pursue claims in state courts that
would otherwise be only available through the federal court system, thereby
altering the procedure that will be followed and the composition of the jury
pool.
This article focuses on the subsequent interpretation of the ACRA by
state and federal courts, as well as how those interpretations sometimes mir-
ror and other times deviate from federal court interpretations of similar fed-
eral acts. Part II surveys the express provisions of the ACRA. Part III dis-
cusses the manner in which state and federal courts have interpreted the
ACRA with regard to issues of employment law. The remaining sections of
this article compare state and federal court interpretations of the Arkansas
and United States constitutions. Part IV discusses claims of immunity by
defendants facing liability under the ACRA. Part V evaluates due process
claims. Part VI analyzes search and seizure jurisprudence under the ACRA.
* The authors are litigators focusing their practice in the areas of municipal law, civil
rights, land use, and employment law. Robert Beard and Michael Mosley are staff attorneys
with the Arkansas Municipal League and Paul Charton practices law with The Catlett Law
Firm, PLC. The authors wish to thank Mark R. Hayes, general counsel for the Arkansas Mu-
nicipal League, for his guidance in the practice of these areas of law.
1. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-105(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2006).
2. See generally Theresa M. Beiner, An Overview of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, 50
ARK. L. REV. 165 (1997) (providing a thorough analysis of the ACRA).
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Finally, the article concludes with a call for clear guidance from the Arkan-
sas courts as well as a recommendation that they should interpret the ACRA
and the Arkansas Constitution in a manner consistent with the federal
courts' interpretation of the United States Constitution by and through the
various corresponding federal rights of action provided by Congress.
II. PROVISIONS OF THE ACRA
At the outset, the ACRA states, "Nothing in [the Act] shall be con-
strued to waive the sovereign immunity of the State of Arkansas."3 The next
section of the ACRA, section 105(a), merits direct quotation:
Civil rights offenses.
(a) Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of this state or any of its political subdivisions subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Arkansas Constitution shall be liable to the party injured in an action in
circuit court for legal and equitable relief or other proper redress.
4
Section 105(b) provides for the payment of court costs and reasonable
attorney's fees to the injured party, under the discretion of, and in the
amount determined by the court.5 Section 105(c) lends guidance to courts
interpreting the provisions of the ACRA: "[W]hen construing this section, a
court may look for guidance to state and federal decisions interpreting...
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... which decisions and act shall have persuasive authori-
ty only."6
Section 106 of the ACRA addresses hate offenses.' Where actions are
motivated by racial, religious, or ethnic animosity, the Act prohibits intimi-
dation or harassment; violence directed at persons; or vandalism directed at
a persons real or personal property.8
Section 107 specifies that "[t]he right of an otherwise qualified person
to be free from discrimination because of race, religion, national origin,
gender, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability is rec-
ognized and declared to be a civil right."9 It also provides for a private right
of action against violators of the ACRA' ° and further explains the applicable
3. ARK. CODEANN. § 16-123-104.
4. Id. § 16-123-105(a).
5. Id. § 16-123-105(b).
6. Id. § 16-123-105(c).
7. Id. § 16-123-106.
8. Id.
9. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(a).
10. Id. § 16-123-107(b).
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statutes of limitations and outlines what punitive damages are recoverable
under the ACRA." The final section of the ACRA prohibits retaliation
against those who opposed any act or practice made unlawful by the
ACRA. 12
III. EMPLOYMENT LAW
As with most civil rights legislation, the Act has profound implications
on discrimination in the workplace. Because ACRA claims are litigated in
both state and federal courts, the article will now discuss the differing ap-
proaches taken by each to decide such actions.
A. State Court Interpretations of the ACRA
There are relatively few reported cases from the Arkansas Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals that substantively interpret the employment
discrimination provisions of the ACRA and their distinctions with federal
civil rights statutes. This section will outline some of the more important
cases to show how the state courts have approached interpreting the ACRA
relative to its interplay with federal jurisprudence.
1. Sexual Harassment
In 2003, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the ACRA provides a
remedy for sexual harassment by an employer.' 3 In Island v. Buena Vista
Resort, an employee alleged that her supervisor had sexually propositioned
her, that she had rebuffed those advances, and that he had repeatedly made
lewd comments to her. "4 She claimed that following her refusal of his sexual
advance she was fired in retaliation-a violation of the ACRA.15
At the trial court level, the employer had filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing inter alia, that the ACRA did not allow a claim for sexual
harassment;"6 the trial court agreed and dismissed the case. 7 On appeal, the
Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision.'
8
11. Id. § 16-123-107(c).
12. Id. § 16-123-108.
13. Island v. Buena Vista Resort, 352 Ark. 548, 103 S.W.3d 671 (2003).
14. Id at 552, 103 S.W.3d at 673.
15. Id. at 553, 103 S.W.3d at 673.
16. Id. at 553, 103 S.W.3d at 673.
17. Id. at 553-54, 103 S.W.3d at 673-74.
18. Id. at 556, 103 S.W.3d at 675.
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Although the ACRA does not explicitly prohibit sexual harassment in
the workplace, 9 the court discussed language in the Act that appeared to
forbid sexual harassment in the workplace:
(a) The right of an otherwise qualified person to be free from discrimina-
tion because of race, religion, national origin, gender, or the presence of
any sensory, mentor, or physical disability is recognized as and declared
to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited to:
(1) The right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination.
20
Acknowledging that the statute requires it to look to federal court deci-
sions in its implementation of the ACRA, the court looked first to the com-
parable language in Title VII.2' The applicable language states:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
22
The court noted that federal courts have interpreted this language as
providing an employee protection against both "sexual harassment due to a
hostile work environment or . . . sexual harassment based on quid pro
quo. 23
[A] plaintiff asserting a hostile work environment claim must show (1)
membership in a protected group or class, (2) unwelcome sexual harass-
ment (3) based upon gender (4) resulting in an effect on a term, condi-
tion, or privilege of employment, and (5) that the employer knew or
should have known about the harassment and failed to take proper re-
medial action. In addition, the plaintiff must show that the sexual ha-
rassment created an environment that was both objectively and subjec-
tively abusive.
24
19. Island, 352 Ark. at 556, 103 S.W.3d at 675.
20. Id. at 556, 103 S.W.3d at 675 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107 (LEXIS Repl.
2006)).
21. Id. at 556, 103 S.W.3d at 675 (quoting ARK. CODEANN. § 16-123-105(c)).
22. Id. at 557, 103 S.W.3d at 676 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000)).
23. Id. at 558, 103 S.W.3d at 676 (citing Henderson v. Simmons Foods Inc., 217 F.3d
612 (8th Cir. 2000)).
24. Id. at 558, 103 S.W.3d at 676 (citing Staton v. Maries County, 868 F.2d 996, 998
(8th Cir. 1989); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
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For a plaintiff to make a prima facie case of quid pro quo harassment,
[she] must show that (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she
was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment in the form of sexual ad-
vances or requests for sexual favors; (3) the harassment was based on
sex; and (4) her submission to the unwelcome advances was an express
or implied condition or receiving job benefits or her refusal to submit re-
sulted in tangible job detriment.
25
The Island court concluded that because the federal interpretation of
analogous civil rights laws permits a claim of sexual harassment, the same
analysis should apply in cases pursued under the ACRA.2 6 In short, the Ar-
kansas court agreed with the federal court that the ACRA does protect
against sexual harassment. Its review of the record showed that the plain-
tiff's allegations and proof were sufficient to defeat summary judgment and,
therefore, it remanded the case for resolution of factual issues related to the
plaintiff's ACRA claims.27
2. Disability Discrimination
In another employment discrimination case, the Arkansas Supreme
Court had to determine whether the ACRA protects an employee who is
discriminated against because he is regarded as disabled, as opposed to dis-
crimination against an individual who is actually disabled under the appli-
cable definition of disability.28 In Faulkner v. Arkansas Children's Hospital,
the court was asked to determine if federal case law interpreting the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act would influence the extension of protection to
those who are regarded as disabled notwithstanding the lack of express lan-
guage providing such coverage in the ACRA. 29 The employee in Faulkner
adamantly insisted that she was not disabled, but claimed that her employer
discriminated against her because it regarded her as disabled.3"
Importantly, the court recognized that the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit had already ruled on this specific issue-
deciding that an Arkansas court "would interpret the ACRA's definition of
'disability' in identical fashion to its federal corollary."'" The Eighth Circuit
25. Island, 352 Ark. at 558, 103 S.W.3d at 676-77 (citing Smith v. Foote's Dixie Dan-
dy, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Ark. 1995)).
26. Id. at 567, 103 S.W.3d at 682.
27. Id. at 567, 103 S.W.3d at 682.
28. 347 Ark. 941, 954, 69 S.W.3d 393, 401 (2002) (discussing ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
23-105(c) LEXIS Repl. (2006)).
29. Id at 954, 69 S.W.3d at 401.
30. Id. at 955, 69 S.W.3d at 402.




concluded that such identical interpretation would lead the Arkansas courts
to extend protection to employees whose employers regarded them as dis-
abled.
32
But the Arkansas Supreme Court noted instead, that "the plain lan-
guage of these two legislative enactments differs significantly. 3 3 The court
further acknowledged, as other similar cases typically have, "that the Arkan-
sas Civil Rights Act specifically provides that our state courts may look to
state and federal decisions which interpret the federal civil rights laws as
persuasive authority for interpretive guidance. 34 However, the Arkansas
statute "does not similarly point to decisions reached interpreting the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act. 35 The Faulkner court declined to follow the
Eighth Circuit's prior decision, reasoning that it was too radical of a depar-
ture from the plain language of the ACRA and that it would be akin to judi-
cial legislating.36
B. Federal Interpretations of the ACRA
While relatively few cases in the Arkansas state courts discuss the inte-
raction between state and federal courts' respective interpretations of the
various employment-related civil rights statutes, there are many more within
the federal court system. This section does not attempt to cover each of
these various attempts by the federal courts to anticipate how Arkansas
courts would eventually rule in ACRA employment cases. Rather, it outlines
the federal courts' general method of analysis of employment discrimination
cases.
There are numerous cases in the federal court system that attempt to in-
terpret and apply the ACRA.37 Yet nearly all of these cases simply add the
ACRA claims as pendent to the already well-established Title VII and sec-
tion 1983 discrimination claims. Most often, the federal claims are decided
with consistent analysis of the two jurisdictions' treatments, or with only an
analysis of the federal claims and a dismissal without prejudice of all state
pendent claims. What is of particular interest is a possible conflict in the
treatment of such cases within Arkansas jurisprudence.
In a typical case, the federal courts simply note the statutory language
in the ACRA providing that a "court may look for guidance to state and
32. Id. at 954, 69 S.W.3d at 401.
33. Id. at 954, 69 S.W.3d at 401.
34. Faulkner, 347 Ark. at 954, 69 S.W.3d at 401.
35. Id. at 954, 69 S.W.3d at 401.
36. Id. at 955, 69 S.W.3d at 402.
37. These cases are in federal court due to the presence of a federal question, but they
also included supplemental claims brought under the ACRA.
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federal decisions interpreting... [section] 1983." 3 The federal courts have
a well-established process to evaluate employment discrimination cases,
using the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis, whereby a
low threshold is set to establish a prima facie case of discrimination before a
higher standard is used to determine if an employer's proffered excuse for
the treatment of the employee is pretextual.39
Once a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the employer to articulate 'a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for its adverse employment action.' If the employer meets its burden, 'the
presumption of discrimination disappears, requiring the plaintiff to prove
that the proffered justification is merely a pretext for discrimination.' The
plaintiff has the burden of persuasion at all times.4°
Although the jurisprudence is not fully developed, presumably the Ar-
kansas courts will follow the federal courts' deeper interpretation of a plain-
tiff's burden to prove discriminatory motive.
In 1993, the Supreme Court of the United States announced that in or-
der to prevail on an employment discrimination claim, it is not enough that a
plaintiff disprove the employer's proffered reason for adverse action taken
against the employee.4 Instead, because the burden of persuasion remains
with the plaintiff, an additional showing of discriminatory intent is re-
quired.42
There is an ongoing discussion among the Arkansas federal district
courts about precisely who the ACRA subjects to liability for retaliation in
an employment context. Unlike the ACRA's employment discrimination
section, the ACRA's retaliation provision is not expressly clear regarding
whether an employee's supervisor can be individually liable for retaliation
claims. In one section of the ACRA, it indicates that any individual who is
injured by employment discrimination by an employer in violation of the
ACRA shall have a private right of action against the employer.43 However,
another section of the ACRA states, "[n]o person shall discriminate against
any individual" in retaliation for exercising his or her ACRA rights.' In
federal jurisprudence, it is clear that retaliation claims under federal em-
38. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-105(c) (LEXIS Repl. 2006); see also Littleton v. Pilot
Travel Ctrs, LLC, 568 F.3d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Clegg v. Ark. Dep't of Corr., 496
F.3d 922, 926 (8th Cir. 2007)).
39. E.g., Turner v. Honeywell Fed. Mfg. & Techs., LLC, 336 F.3d 716, 720 (8th Cir.
2003) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-04 (1973)).
40. Davis v. KARK-TV, Inc., 421 F.3d 699, 704 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
41. St. Mary's Honor Ctr v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).
42. Id. ("It is not enough, in other words, to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must
believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination.").
43. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(c)(1)(A).
44. Id. § 16-123-108 (emphasis added).
20101
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ployment statutes do not impose liability against supervisors individually."5
Interestingly, the Arkansas federal district courts have recently been at-
tempting to resolve this very question.46
In 2002, Judge Eisele of the Eastern District of Arkansas, decided that
a supervisor may be individually liable to an employee for retaliation under
the ACRA, contrary to Title VII.47 Judge Eisele specifically noted in his
ruling that this was a preliminary decision on the issue and that the court
would "not hesitate to revisit the issue upon additional briefing from the
parties."48 This decision, therefore, creates a significant distinction between
the ACRA and the body of law interpreting Title VII.49 Among the other
judges of the United States district courts of Arkansas who have confronted
this issue, some have followed the decision that supervisors are liable for
retaliation claims under the ACRA, whereas some others have not.5
In 2008, the Arkansas Supreme Court accepted certification of this par-
ticular question because it may have been determinative in a pending case.5
In his certifying order, Judge Moody of the Eastern District of Arkansas
noted:
The issue of whether an individual supervisor can be held personally lia-
ble for alleged acts of retaliation under [the ACRA] is likely to arise re-
peatedly in federal diversity cases, as well as in Arkansas circuit court
cases. There is no precedent from the Arkansas Supreme Court on this
45. See, e.g., Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 143 F.3d 1103 (8th Cir. 1998) (supervisor
could be held liable only as an employee of Wal-Mart, not as an individual); Bonomolo-
Hagen v. Clay Central-Everly Cmty. Sch. Dist., 121 F.3d 446, 447 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Our
Court quite recently has squarely held that supervisors may not be held individually liable
under Title VII.") (citation omitted); Smith v. St. Bernard's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 1254,
1255 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Young-Parker v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 4:09CV00202
JMM (E.D. Ark. Apr. 29, 2009) ("Plaintiffs Title VII, ADA, and ADEA claims... fail as
supervisors are not individually liable under Title VII, ADA, or the ADEA.").
46. Unless and until the state courts settle this issue, the authors believe that Arkansas
circuit courts should follow the federal jurisprudence on this issue as directed by the statute.
See ARK. CODEANN. § 16-123-105(c).
47. Vineyard v. EWI, Inc., No. 02-609 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 16, 2002) (order granting in part
and denying in part a motion to dismiss).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Whitney v. Unibar Maintenance Service, Inc., No. 04-561 (E.D. Ark. June
23, 2004) (order denying motion to remand).
50. Id.. See also Gizlow v. Lenders Title Co., No. 05-5091 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 29, 2005)
(order granting in part and denying in part a motion for protective order and stay of discov-
ery); Wilson v. Zieglar, No. 03-306 (E.D. Ark. May 28, 2004) (order denying motion to
dismiss). Cf Whitney v. Unibar Maintenance Services, Inc., No. 04-561 (E.D. Ark. June 23,
2004).
51. Battles v. Townsend, 374 Ark. 59, 285 S.W.3d 629 (2008).
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issue. There is also no consensus among the Judges of the United States
District Courts on this issue.
52
Judge Moody was correct in his prediction that this issue was sure to be
revisited in future claims of retaliation under the ACRA. His prescience was
evidenced approximately a year later by a motion to certify this very ques-
tion before Judge Wilson in the Eastern District of Arkansas.53 In Murphy v.
Bunge Corp. of North America, Judge Wilson has been asked to have the
Arkansas Supreme Court determine whether "an individual may be sued
,,54under the ACRA for retaliation ....
It would be useful to future litigants if the Arkansas Supreme Court re-
solves this matter. Otherwise, plaintiffs will remain unclear as to their rights,
the proper jurisdiction in which such ACRA retaliation claims may be pur-
sued, and even which defendants to sue. If the Arkansas Supreme Court
does accept and resolve this pending question, it will undoubtedly clarify a
legal matter that has divided the federal bench. Considering Arkansas courts
are statutorily directed to use federal jurisprudence as persuasive authority
in interpreting the ACRA,55 this matter is all the more confusing.
IV. IMMUNITY
Arkansas courts have addressed the concept of immunity for govern-
mental officials in many contexts. This section will discuss immunity from
liability and suit for governmental officials from claims under the ACRA. In
order to understand immunity in the context of a civil rights act claim, how-
ever, it is necessary to understand the state's statutory scheme for immunity
for governmental officials from state torts.
A. The State of Arkansas and its Employees
In Simons v. Marshall, the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed claims
of unreasonable seizure and violation of due process under both the United
States Constitution via section 1983 and the Arkansas Constitution via the
ACRA 6 The essential facts alleged by the appellee Marshall were that,
52. Battles v. Townsend, No. 08-117 (E.D. Ark. May 20, 2008). The question of wheth-
er a supervisor can be held personally liable for retaliation under the ACRA was never
reached by the Arkansas Supreme Court because the case below was settled and the certified
question was rescinded.
53. Brief in Support of Motion to Remand, Response to Motion to Dismiss, or to Certify
the Issue to the Arkansas Supreme Court, Murphy v. Bunge Corp. of N. Amer., No.
5:90CV0271 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 27, 2009).
54. Id.
55. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-105(c) (LEXIS Repl. 2006).
56. 369 Ark. 447, 255 S.W.3d 838 (2007).
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during a traffic stop, Simons, a state trooper, groped Marshall's breasts and
legs.57 Marshall alleged that these acts violated her rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution and the ACRA.58
The provisions of the Arkansas Constitution presumably at issue were ar-
ticle II, section 15, the Arkansas Constitution's analogue to the Fourth
Amendment; and article II, section 8, which most closely resembles the due
process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 9 That claim was dis-
missed without prejudice and Marshall later refiled the case against Simons
alleging violation of her right against unreasonable seizure, specifically
claiming that Simons acted maliciously and with the intent to harass and
demean her.6°
Simons filed a motion to dismiss, claiming immunity from suit pur-
suant to article V, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution which states:
"The State of Arkansas shall never be made a defendant in any of her
courts."'" Simons also moved to dismiss the claim against him in his indi-
vidual capacity based on section 19-10-305(a) of the Arkansas Code.62 The
trial court denied the motion and Simons took an interlocutory appeal to the
Arkansas Supreme Court. 63 The Arkansas Supreme Court accepted the ap-
peal as proper given that it was from a denial of a motion to dismiss based
on the assertion of immunity by a governmental official.'
57. Id. at 448-49, 255 S.W.3d at 840.
58. Id at 449, 255 S.W.3d at 840.
59. See id. at 449, 255 S.W.3d at 840. The opinion does not list these provisions as those
that the Plaintiff claimed were violated; however, the ACRA is a conduit by which one may
sue to redress violations of the Arkansas Constitution or other laws of the state. Consequent-
ly, it is necessarily true that the Arkansas Constitution's provisions for unreasonable seizure
and due process were at issue as the ACRA does not create a substantive right itself under
section 16-123-105(a) of the Arkansas Code.
60. Id. at 449, 255 S.W.3d at 840.
61. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 20. Simons's claim of immunity under this provision of the
Arkansas Constitution was a claim of sovereign immunity in his "official capacity." "Official
capacity" claims regard only the governmental entity for which the official works, not the
individual official. Consequently, sovereign immunity is immunity available to the State of
Arkansas, not individual employees of the state. Simons also claimed immunity in his "indi-
vidual capacity" under section 19-10-305(a) of the Arkansas Code, which is immunity avail-
able to individual employees of the State of Arkansas. Simons, 369 Ark. at 449, 255 S.W.3d
at 840.
62. Simons, 369 Ark. at 449, 255 S.W.3d at 840.
63. Id at 449-50, 255 S.W.3d at 840.
64. Id. at 450, 255 S.W.3d at 841. The rationale of permitting an interlocutory appeal
from the denial of a claim of immunity is that (1) governmental officials should not be re-
quired to engage in protracted litigation where they did not violate clearly established law of
which a reasonable official would have known, and (2) because immunity is effectively lost if
a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. However, this rationale does not preclude a
claim of immunity at successive stages of litigation in federal court, up to and following trial,
[Vol. 32
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The court first noted that Simons's claim of immunity in his official
capacity was a claim of sovereign immunity based on article V, section 20
of the Arkansas Constitution.65 The court held, consistent with federal juri-
sprudence, that a claim against a governmental official in his or her "official
capacity" is only a claim against the governmental entity that employs the
individual.66 In this case, the governmental entity was the State of Arkansas,
and the claim against Simons in his official capacity was not a claim against
Simons as an individual.
The court noted that, through the ACRA, the State explicitly retained
sovereign immunity for claims against it.67 Consequently, under article V,
section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution, the Arkansas Supreme Court held
that Simons was entitled to sovereign immunity from his suit in his official
68capacity.
The court next addressed Simons's claim of immunity from suit in his
individual capacity pursuant to section 19-10-305(a) of the Arkansas Code.69
That section states: "Officers and employees of the State of Arkansas are
immune from liability and from suit, except to the extent that they may be
covered by liability insurance, for damages for acts or omissions, other than
malicious acts or omissions, occurring within the scope of their employ-
ment. ' '7' The court recognized that a state official in his personal capacity is
permitted to assert a "qualified immunity" similar to that which is available
to federal officials.7" The court found that qualified immunity for state offi-
cials emanates from section 19-10-305 of the Arkansas Code, which also
provides immunity from other causes of action, including state-law torts
where the official does not have liability insurance, the actions alleged are
nonmalicious, and the actions alleged were taken within the course and
scope of the governmental official's employment.72
and there is no reason a different rule should apply to claims of immunity from actions under
the ACRA. See Littrell v. Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 586 (8th Cir. 2004).
65. Simons, 369 Ark. at 450-51,255 S.W.3d at 841.
66. Id. at 451, 255 S.W.3d at 841. See also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165
(1985).
67. Simons, 369 Ark. at 451, 255 S.W.3d at 841 ("'Nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to waive the sovereign immunity of the State of Arkansas."') (quoting ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-123-104 (LEXIS Repl. 2006)).
68. Id. at 451, 255 S.W.3d at 842.
69. Id. at 452, 255 S.W.3d at 842. The court employs the term "personal capacity" but
the term is used interchangeably with "individual capacity."
70. ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-10-305(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2007). By its terms, the statute pro-
vides immunity to state officials, but not county or municipal governmental officials; howev-
er, section 21-9-301 of the Arkansas Code provides a similar immunity for county and mu-
nicipal officials. See infra Part W.B.
71. Simons, 369 Ark. at 452, 255 S.W.3d at 842.
72. Id. at 452, 255 S.W.3d at 842.
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First, the court discussed qualified immunity. An official is immune
from liability and suit if his or her "actions did not violate clearly estab-
lished principles of law of which a reasonable person would have know-
ledge., 73 The federal courts have a large body of jurisprudence concerning
qualified immunity.74
"[Q]ualified immunity provides immunity from suit rather than a mere
defense to liability, and ... is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permit-
ted to go to trial., 75 The defense is designed to "protect officials from the
disruptions of going to trial as well as from liability for money damages...
[i]t is important for public officials to be shielded from the burden of trial on
insubstantial claims., 76 Accordingly, a court generally should rule upon the
defense "at the earliest possible time. 77
In deciding the immunity question, the court should "ask whether the
agents acted reasonably under settled law in the circumstances, not whether
another reasonable, or more reasonable interpretation of the events can be
constructed ... .,71 "Government officials performing discretionary func-
tions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known., 79 The test for qualified
immunity is an objective one.8"
A court reviewing a claim of qualified immunity should ask two essen-
tial questions: (1) whether the plaintiff has "asserted a violation of a consti-
tutional or statutory right; and (2) if so, whether that right was clearly estab-
lished at the time of the violation."'" If the answer to either question is no,
73. Id. at 452, 255 S.W.3d at 842.
74. See id. at 452, 255 S.W.3d at 842 ("This court has recognized that the immunity
provided by section 19-10-305 is similar to that provided by the Supreme Court for federal
civil-rights claims.") (citing Fegans v. Norris, 351 Ark. 200, 207, 89 S.W.3d 919, 924
(2002)).
75. Brown v. Nix, 33 F.3d 951, 953 (8th Cir. 1994) (citations and internal quotations
omitted).
76. Wright v. S. Ark. Reg'l Health Ctr., Inc., 800 F.2d 199, 202 (8th Cir. 1986) (citing
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)).
77. Id. at 203.
78. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (per curiam). Officials should not have
to always err on the side of caution out of fear of being sued. Id. at 229.
79. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). "The qualified immunity standard
'gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by protecting 'all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law."' Hunter, 502 U.S. at 229 (quoting Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986)).
80. See Gorra v. Hanson, 880 F.2d 95, 97 (8th Cir. 1989).
81. Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 673 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc). That court also
framed the issue this way: .' [W]e must consider what specific constitutional rights the defen-
dants allegedly violated, whether the rights were clearly established in law at the time of the
alleged violation, and whether a reasonable person in the official's position would have
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the governmental official is entitled to qualified immunity. When faced with
an assertion of qualified immunity in the context of a motion for summary
judgment pursuant to either Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 56 or Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the court should address a third question if ne-
cessary: "[W]hether, given the facts most favorable to the plaintiffs, there
are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether a reasonable official
would have known that the alleged action violated that right.""2
It can be argued that the Arkansas courts have adopted these general
principles about the doctrine of qualified immunity.83 Furthermore, in prac-
tice it is evident that the court's decision in Simons entails that state em-
ployees enjoy an increased measure of immunity under section 19-10-305 of
the Arkansas Code. Under the statute, state officials are entitled to "immuni-
ty from civil liability for non-malicious acts occurring within the course
[and scope] of their employment. 84 Malice is defined as:
[A]n intent and disposition to do a wrongful act greatly injurious to
another.., the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or
excuse, with an intent to inflict an injury or under circumstances that the
law will imply an evil intent ... [a] conscious violation of the law...
which operates to the prejudice of another person. A condition of the
mind showing a heart... fatally bent on mischief.
85
In addition to the claims of constitutional violations, the appellee in
Simons also asserted the state-law intentional torts of assault and battery. 6
Nevertheless, pursuant to section 19-10-305 of the Arkansas Code, the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court found that Simons was entitled to immunity in his
"individual capacity" from all of Marshall's claims. 87 In practice, as evi-
denced by the Simons opinion, the statute provides broader protection to
state officials because, even if it is shown that a state official violated a
clearly established right, a plaintiff must still plead and prove facts demon-
strating malice.
Indeed, the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled in Simons that Marshall's
allegations that Simons had groped her breasts and legs were conclusory and
failed to allege facts demonstrating "either malice or a conscious violation
known that his conduct would violate such rights.' Id. at 674 n.8 (quoting Waddell v. For-
ney, 108 F.3d 889, 891 (8th Cir. 1997)).
82. Id. at 673-74.
83. See Simons v. Marshall, 369 Ark. 447, 452,255 S.W.3d 838, 842 (2007).
84. Id. at 452, 255 S.W.3d at 842 (citing Grine v. Board of Trustees, 338 Ark. 791, 797,
2 S.W.3d 54, 58 (1999)).
85. Id. at 452-53 (quoting Satterfield v. Rebsamen Ford, Inc., 253 Ark. 181, 185, 485
S.W.2d 192, 195 (1972); BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY, 956-57 (6th ed. 1990)).
86. Id. at 452, 255 S.W.3d at 842.
87. See id. at 454-55,255 S.W.3d at 843-44.
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of existing law."88 The court granted both qualified immunity-as can be
seen from its finding that the appellee failed to plead facts sufficient to dem-
onstrate a "conscious violation of existing law"--and statutory immunity, as
the court found the appellee failed to plead facts demonstrating malice. 89
Notably, Simons' immunity extended to Marshall's state law claims of as-
sault and battery, both intentional torts.9°
B. Municipal and County Officials
In Smith v. Brt, the Arkansas Supreme Court discussed qualified im-
munity asserted by Brt, the mayor of the city of Elkins, Arkansas, as an af-
firmative defense to Appellant Smith's claims that Brt fired him in retalia-
tion for speech protected under article II, section 6 of the Arkansas Constitu-
tion.9' The following facts were alleged. Smith, the Elkins police chief,
appeared at a city council meeting where he voiced issues with a city build-
ing moratorium. 92 Smith left the meeting after becoming angry because of a
statement made by one of the councilpersons.93 After the meeting, Smith
approached Brt and voiced his anger with the councilperson's remark, even
commenting that he (Smith) wanted to physically strike the councilperson.94
Another city employee informed the mayor that Smith smelled of alcohol at
the meeting. 95 Smith later called Brt and apologized for his behavior.96 Nev-
ertheless, Mayor Brt gave Smith a written reprimand for "drinking at a pub-
lic meeting and for his unprofessional comments during and after the meet-
ing."
97
Several days later, based on information provided to Brt that Smith had
allegedly failed to file documents in police files regarding break-ins in the
city, Brt terminated Smith.98 Smith filed suit against Brt in both his individ-
ual and official capacities under the ACRA claiming that he was terminated
in violation of article II, section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution which pro-
88. Id. at 454-55, 255 S.W.3d at 843-44. In so ruling, the court recognized that, in his
answer, Simons averred that he had conducted a pat-down search on Marshall. Id. at 454, 255
S.W.3d at 843-44. The court was not persuaded by Marshall's conclusion that Simons's acts
were sexual in nature and, without further facts alleged demonstrating malice, it would not
permit Marshall's allegations to overcome Simons's immunity. Id. at 454, 255 S.W.3d at 844.
89. Simons, 369 Ark. at 455, 255 S.W.3d at 844.
90. Id. at 454-55, 255 S.W.3d at 843.
91. 363 Ark. 126, 211 S.W.3d 485 (2005).
92. Id. at 126-27,211 S.W.3d at 486-87.
93. Id. at 127, 211 S.W.3d at 487.
94. Id. at 127, 211 S.W.3d at 487.
95. Id. at 127, 211 S.W.3d at 487.
96. Id. at 127, 211 S.W.3d at 487.
97. Brt, 363 Ark. at 127, 211 S.W.3d at 487.
98. Id. at 127, 211 S.W.3d at 487.
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tects free speech.99 Smith claimed that he was terminated solely in retaliation
for the comments he made at the council meeting about the city's building
moratorium. '
Brt filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting qualified immuni-
ty, and argued his entitlement to summary judgment in his individual ca-
pacity because Smith's statements were not on a matter of "public concern"
and because Smith would have been terminated even in the absence of the
statements he made regarding the moratorium."°
Brt's defensive claims track federal jurisprudence regarding First
Amendment retaliation claims brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of
1871,102 commonly referred to as section 1983. The proper analysis for a
retaliation claim under section 1983 and the First Amendment is as fol-
lows: 10 3 First, did the plaintiff show that his or her speech touched on a mat-
ter of "public concern" thereby making it protected activity? 10 4 If the to the
first question is no, the inquiry ends and a defendant is entitled to judg-
ment. 105 On the other hand, if the activity in question did involve a matter of
public concern, a court then looks to whether the defendant's legitimate
interests as employer, deferentially viewed, outweigh First Amendment in-
terests, if there are any at stake-the Pickering balancing test. 1 6 If the em-
ployer's interest outweighs any First Amendment interests at stake, the de-
fendant is entitled to judgment.0 7
In conducting the Pickering balancing test, the court should take into
account the fact that "[t]he government's interest in achieving its goals as
effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively subordi-
nate interest when it acts as sovereign, to a significant one when it acts as
employer.' 1 8 The Pickering balancing test is conducted only if a court finds
that the activity touched upon a matter of public concern; both the question
99. Id. at 128,211S.W.3dat487.
100. Id. at 128,211S.W.3dat487.
101. Id. at 128,211 S.W.3d at 487.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
103. This is based on section 16-123-105(c) of the Arkansas Code, which states that
because federal decisions regarding section 1983 are persuasive authority, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court may employ the two-part test when faced with claims pursuant to article II,
section 6 of the Arkansas Constitution.
104. Hoffman v. Mayor of Liberty, 905 F.2d 229, 233 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417-21 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
105. See Hoffman, 905 F.2d at 233; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417-21 ("[W]hen pub-
lic employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speak-
ing as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline.").
106. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
107. Id.
108. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994) (plurality).
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of "public concern" and the Pickering balancing test are issues of law for a
court to decide.'0 9
If the plaintiff survives the analysis identified above, then the next
question is whether the plaintiff showed that the alleged protected activity
was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's action against
him."I If the answer to this question is no, the defendant should likewise
prevail."'1 If the answer is yes, then the question becomes would the defen-
dant have taken the same action absent the alleged protected activity, i.e.,
the "same decision" test?" 2 If the defendant would have made the same de-
cision even in the absence of the protected conduct, i.e., speech or petition-
ing, then the defendant will prevail.'
In Brt, the mayor claimed in his motion for summary judgment that he
should prevail based on the aforementioned test."4 The Arkansas Supreme
Court first reiterated that the claim against Brt in his official capacity was a
claim against the city of Elkins, not against Brt personally; however, Brt
was also sued in his individual capacity." 5 Regarding Brt's claim of immun-
ity, the court found that the entitlement to qualified immunity for a munici-
pal official emanates from section 21-9-301 of the Arkansas Code; however,
the court said:
Our interpretation of section 21-9-301 must begin with the analysis this
court has used in interpreting the counterpart qualified-immunity statute that
applies to state employees, codified at section 19-10-305. Section 19-10-305
provides state employees with qualified immunity from civil liability for
non-malicious acts occurring within the scope of their employment.
116
109. Sparr v. Ward, 306 F.3d 589, 594 (8th Cir. 2002).
110. Hoffinan, 905 F.2d at 233.
111. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. Smith v. Brt, 363 Ark. 126, 128, 211 S.W.3d 485, 487-88 (2005).
115. Id. at 130,211 S.W.3d at 488-89.
116. Id. at 130, 211 S.W.3d at 489. From this statement, a municipal or county official
claiming immunity pursuant to section 21-9-301 of the Arkansas Code could arguably assert
that not only are they entitled to immunity where it is not alleged or shown that they have
committed the violation of clearly established law, but also where a plaintiff has failed to
allege facts demonstrating malice, as in Simons v. Marshall. However, the argument was
foreclosed in City of Fayetteville v. Romine, where the Arkansas Supreme Court found that
because section 21-9-301 of the Arkansas Code does not explicitly reference immunity for
nonmalicious acts, as section 19-10-305 does, the presence or absence of malice is "irrele-
vant." 373 Ark. 318, 325, 284 S.W.3d 10, 16 (2008). Interestingly, although the court has
routinely held that section 21-9-301 of the Arkansas Code provides immunity only from
negligence, and not intentional acts, the statute does not make such a distinction; rather, it
provides immunity from "liability and from suit for damages" and states that "[n]o tort action
shall lie .... " See City of Farmington v. Smith, 366 Ark. 473, 478, 237 S.W.3d 1 (2006)
(citing Deitsch v. Tillery, 309 Ark. 401, 833 S.W.2d 760 (1992)). Indeed, the history of the
distinction between negligence and intentional torts under section 21-9-301 is not helpful. In
[Vol. 32
ARKANSAS CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Section 21-9-301 of the Arkansas Code states:
(a) It is declared to be the public policy of the State of Arkansas that all
counties, municipal corporations, school districts, special improvement
districts, and all other political subdivisions of the state and any of their
boards, commissions, agencies, authorities, or other governing bodies
shall be immune from liability and from suit for damages except to the
extent that they may be covered by liability insurance.
(b) No tort action shall lie against any such political subdivision because
of the acts of its agents and employees." 
7
The court in Brt stated the standards for the defense of qualified im-
munity which mirror those used by the federal courts."8 The court noted that
the question of whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity is a
question of law." 9
Next, the court found that Smith had sufficiently pled the violation of a
clearly established constitutional right under the ACRA. 2 ° In so finding, the
court then essentially employed the third prong identified in Burnham v.
Ianni,121 which the federal courts have found applies when a defendant as-
serts qualified immunity in the context of a motion for summary judgment:
"[W]hether, given the facts most favorable to the plaintiffs, there are no
Deitsch, the court cites Waire v. Joseph, 308 Ark. 528, 825 S.W.2d 594 (1992), for the prop-
osition that immunity only extends to negligence. Deitsch, 309 Ark. at 407, 833 S.W.2d at
762 (1992). Yet, the court in Waire cites to Cousins v. Dennis, 298 Ark. 310, 767 S.W.2d 296
(1989), which does not state that immunity only applies to negligence actions; rather, Cousins
only involved a claim for negligence, thus the court had no need to rule on whether immunity
under section 21-9-301 applies to intentional torts. See Waire, 308 Ark. at 534, 825 S.W.2d at
598; Cousins, 298 Ark. at 312, 767 S.W.2d at 297. Reading the plain language of the statute
it is arguable that the intent of the legislature was to provide immunity for county and munic-
ipal governments and their officials, for all actions involving liability or damages, except
those for which the legislature specifically provides a private right of action, i.e., ACRA
claims, claims for illegal exactions, the Arkansas Whistle-blower Act, the inverse condemna-
tion statute, etc. Consequently, if this interpretation of section 21-9-301 were adopted, a
plaintiff could not state a tort claim of any nature against a governmental entity or official
listed in the statute, but could sue where the legislature has created specific causes of action
or the governmental entity has liability insurance which would cover such claims.
117. ARK. CoDEANN. § 21-9-301 (LEXIS Repl. 2004).
118. Brt, 363 Ark. at 130-31,211 S.W.3d 485,489-90.
119. Id. at 131, 211 S.W.3d at 490. See also Gentry v. Robinson, 2009 Ark. 634, __
S.W.3d __ (Dec. 17, 2009).
120. Id. at 131, 211 S.W.3d at 490 ("[W]e have no doubt that Smith has alleged a viola-
tion of a clearly established constitutional ight-the right to freedom of speech under the
Arkansas Constitution.").
121. 119 F.3d 668, 673-74 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Furthermore, "courts deciding ques-
tions of immunity must also recognize that whether summary judgment on such grounds is
appropriate from a particular set of facts is a question of law." Gentry v. Robinson, 2009 Ark.
634, _ S.W.3d (Dec. 17, 2009).
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genuine issues of material fact as to whether a reasonable official would
have known that the alleged action violated that right."'
' 2
In Brt, the undisputed facts, as reported by the court, demonstrated that
Smith's termination occurred fifteen days after his statements at the council
meeting, and that Brt found that Smith had allegedly failed to document
break-ins in the community.' Consequently, the court found that a reason-
able official in Brt's position would not know that terminating Smith under
the circumstances would violate the Arkansas Constitution. 1
24
When considering the aforementioned standards employed by federal
courts reviewing retaliation claims under the First Amendment and section
1983, the Arkansas Supreme Court's holding appears to embrace the "sub-
stantial or motivating factor" element of a plaintiffs prima facie case of
discrimination. That is, the decision can be read as finding that the undis-
puted facts revealed Smith's termination was not substantially motivated by
his speech.'25 Arguably, the decision also embraces the "same-decision" test
announced in Board of Education v. Doyle, where a defendant-employer is
entitled to judgment if it would have taken the same action against the em-
ployee even in the absence of the employee's protected conduct.'26
In a more recent decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court found an offi-
cial for the city of Fayetteville was entitled to qualified immunity for a tak-
ings claim under article II, section 22 of the Arkansas Constitution. 127 In
122. Brt, 363 Ark. at 131-32, 211 S.W.3d at 490. Indeed, in Gentry v. Robinson, the court
noted that, "as a precursor to the immunity analysis, this court must first find that [a plaintiff]
alleged facts or met proof with proof sufficient to raise afact question concerning a constitu-
tional violation...." 2009 Ark. 634, _ S.W.3d _ (Dec. 17, 2009) (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 131,211 S.W.3d at 490.
124. Id. at 131, 211 S.W.3d at 490. The court refers to whether Mayor Brt could have
reasonably known that his termination violated the Arkansas Constitution. The ruling is in
harmony with the standard for qualified immunity which seeks to identify if a reasonable
official in the position of the particular defendant would conclude that the defendant's actions
violated a constitutional or statutory right. See id. at 131, 211 S.W.3d at 489 (citing Baldridge
v. Cordes, 350 Ark. 114, 120-21, 85 S.W.3d 511, 514-15 (2002)).
125. See id. at 131-32, 211 S.W.3d at 489-90. See also Hoffman v. Mayor of Liberty,
905 F.2d 229, 233 (8th Cir. 1990).
126. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977).
127. City of Fayetteville v. Romine, 373 Ark. 318, 284 S.W.3d 10 (2008). Although the
court noted that appellant David Jurgens, the city's water and sewer superintendent, claimed
immunity under section 21-9-301 of the Arkansas Code in his "official capacity," and that
Romine explicitly claimed she was suing Jurgens in his official capacity, it appears the court
actually adjudicated whether Jurgens was entitled to qualified immunity in his personal ca-
pacity. Thus, the reference to "official capacity" can be read, not as an indication that the
claim was only against the City, but rather that the claim was against a governmental official
acting pursuant to his or her "official duties' as was discussed in Cousins v. Dennis, 298 Ark.
310, 767 S.W.2d 296 (1989). This is the only logical way to interpret the opinion because the
City was a separate defendant and, after the appeal, the case went to trial against the City
where the City was found liable. Ron Wood, Fayetteville Ordered to Pay for Raw Sewage in
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City of Fayetteville v. Romine, a private citizen, Romine sued both the city
and Jurgens, the water and sewer superintendent, claiming that they were
responsible for not fixing an overflow of sewage across her property that
occurred for a number of years. 128 The court again accepted an interlocutory
appeal from the denial of Jurgens's motion for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity and noted that Romine's claim was one essentially for
inverse condemnation pursuant to article II, section 22 of the Arkansas Con-
stitution.2 9 To prevail in an action for a "taking" or inverse condemnation,
Woman's Yard, THE MORNING NEWS, Oct. 28, 2008, available at
http://nwaonline.com/articles/2008/l0/28/news/l02908fzromine.txt, but see Gentry v. Robin-
son, 2009 Ark. 634, _ S.W.3d _ (Dec. 17, 2009) (discussing Romine). Had the court
adjudicated the claim against Jurgens in his official capacity, it would have, in effect, adjudi-
cated the issue against the City, and the case would have ended in toto on appeal. See Simons
v. Marshall, 369 Ark. 447, 451, 225 S.W.3d 838, 841-42 (2007) (stating that official capacity
suits are against the entity for which the official works, not the official personally). In order
to sue a governmental official personally, that official must be sued in his or her "individual"
or "personal" capacity. Id. at 452, 255 S.W.3d at 842. See also Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 165 (1985); Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999)
("In order to sue a public official in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff must expressly
and unambiguously state so in the pleadings, otherwise, it will be assumed that the defendant
is sued only in his or her official capacity.").
128. Romine, 373 Ark. at 320, 284 S.W.3d at 12.
129. Id. at 320-23, 284 S.W.3d at 12-15. The courts have held that a plaintiff cannot state
a "takings" claim without seeking and being denied just compensation by and through the
state's available remedies. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n. v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172, 194-95 (1985) ("If the government has provided an adequate process for ob-
taining compensation, and if resort to that process 'yield[s] just compensation,' then the
property owner 'has no claim against the Government' for a taking."... "[I]f a state provides
an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a
violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied
just compensation."); Cormack v. Settle-Beshears, 474 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that
in order to state a claim, landowner was required to bring suit under the Arkansas inverse
condemnation statute first); Collier v. City of Springdale, 733 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1984).
Consequently, a claim under the Fifth Amendment that the government has substantially
diminished the value of one's property, with a prayer for just compensation, must first be
brought under section 18-15-102 of the Arkansas Code, and only where that process fails to
yield just compensation may a plaintiff state a claim for a "taking." Williamson County, 473
U.S. at 194-95. There is no substantive reason the result should be different in an Arkansas
state court, where a landowner seeks to state a takings claim under the Arkansas Constitution.
See DeBoer v. Entergy Arkansas, Inc., 82 Ark. App. 400, 404, 109 S.W.3d 142, 145 (2004)
(remedies under the act are exclusive). Only in the event that a landowner has brought suit
under that statute and been denied just compensation, should the landowner be able to bring
suit claiming a taking without just compensation.
The federal courts have explained that a plaintiff cannot state a claim for a taking
unless he or she has sought and been denied just compensation, as the denial of just compen-
sation is an essential element of a takings claim. The State of Arkansas has provided an ade-
quate remedy for damage to one's property. This is conceptually different from whether a
plaintiff has exhausted his or her remedies; rather, a plaintiff cannot state a claim unless he or
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the plaintiff was required to prove, inter alia, that the government or its offi-
cials intentionally undertook actions that substantially diminished the value
of the plaintiff's land.'30
Under the previously established standard for qualified immunity, the
court found that Romine had alleged the violation of a constitutional right,
and that the right was clearly established, i.e., "the right to be free from gov-
ernment action that diminishes the value of [one's] land."'' The court then
focused on the third factor, which is proper for consideration if the defense
of qualified immunity is interposed in conjunction with a motion for sum-
mary judgment: whether the plaintiff has "raised a genuine issue of fact as to
whether the official would have known that the conduct violated that clearly
established right." '132
The court noted that Jurgens had proffered deposition testimony in
support of his motion, wherein he testified that it was his belief, based on
various facts, that the sewer line in question was not a public sewer line.133
Romine failed to offer any evidence to refute that fact. 34 The court ruled
that Romine had failed to raise a genuine issue of fact that an official in Jur-
gen's position would know that failing to fix the nonpublic sewer line vi-
olated Romine's constitutional right.'35 Thus, the court reversed the trial
court's order denying Jurgens summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity."'
C. Claims Against an Entity
The Arkansas Supreme Court has had very few opportunities to discuss
claims brought against a governmental entity under the ACRA. If the entity
is the State of Arkansas, sovereign immunity precludes the claim under the
Act. 137 Otherwise, "local governments can be sued directly under [section
she has sought redress under the state inverse condemnation statute and has been denied just
compensation.
130. Romine, 373 Ark. at 326, 284 S.W.3d at 16.
131. Id. at 323, 284 S.W.3d at 14.
132. Id. at 323, 284 S.W.3d at 15; see also Gentry v. Robinson, 2009 Ark. 634, __
S.W.3d - (Dec. 17, 2009).
133. Id. at 324, 284 S.W.3d at 15.
134. Id. at 325, 284 S.W.3d at 15.
135. Id. at 325, 284 S.W.3d at 16. Interestingly, Romine's claim that the city and Jurgens
owed her a duty conjures up a theory of negligence, rather than a claim of intentional wrong-
doing, as negligence claims embrace the theories of duty and breach. In that event, even
though the claim was brought under the ACRA, Romine's claim should have failed. Hart v.
City of Little Rock, 432 F.3d 801, 805-06 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that claims of negligence,
even gross negligence, under the United States Constitution by and through 42 U.S.C. section
1983, fell short of stating a claim upon which relief could be granted).
136. Romine, 373 Ark. at 326, 284 S.W.3d at 16-17.
137. Simons v. Marshall, 369 Ark. 447, 451, 225 S.W.3d 838, 841 (2007).
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1983] if the alleged unconstitutional action implements or executes a 'policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promul-
gated by that body's officers.' Liability may also attach pursuant to govern-
mental 'custom,' even though such a custom has not received formal ap-
proval.' 38 Under either theory--"policy" or "custom"-if the court finds
the absence of an underlying constitutional violation, the court's inquiry is
at an end and the entity is entitled to judgment. 39 Furthermore, "'[a] local
government may not be sued under [section 1983] for an injury inflicted
solely by its employees or agents' on a theory of respondeat superior."14°
For claims that an entity's policy should bind that entity to liability, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas has said
that "a municipal policy is not unconstitutional if it might permit unconstitu-
tional conduct in some circumstances; it is unconstitutional only if it 're-
quire[s] its officers to act unconstitutionally."" 4 A plaintiff must also show
that the policy at issue was the "moving force" behind the alleged constitu-
tional violation.142 It is also true that a single official might bind a govern-
mental entity to liability for his or her actions as a "policy," but only where
it can be said that the particular official possesses final policy-making au-
thority.'43 The question of who has the final authority to make policy with
respect to a particular issue is a question of state law.'
4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has stated
three elements for determining, in the absence of policy, whether an uncons-
138. Deitsch v. Tillery, 309 Ark. 401, 409, 833 S.W.2d 760, 764 (1992) (quoting Monell
v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). Based on the Arkansas Supreme Court's
discussion of the federal standard for claims in Deitsch, which was rendered prior to the
enactment of the ACRA, such claims brought under the ACRA should also employ this stan-
dard. As of this writing, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided Gentry v. Robinson, employing
this standard in the context of a claim of rape by a county jail inmate, allegedly by a jailer,
who sued the county and the county judge based on allegations that the county had a policy
or custom of failing to adequately screen applicants for jailer positions. 2009 Ark. 634,
S.W.3d __ (Dec. 17, 2009).
139. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).
140. Andrews v. Fowler, F.3d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at
694).
141. Handle v. City of Little Rock, 772 F. Supp. 434, 438 (E.D. Ark. 1991) (citing Kerr
v. City of West Palm Beach, 875 F.2d 1546, 1554 (1 th Cir. 1989)).
142. Wedemeier v. City of Ballwin, 931 F.2d 24, 26 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Monell, 436
U.S. at 694); Gentry v. Robinson, 2009 Ark. 634, _ S.W.3d _ (Dec. 17, 2009).
143. McGautha v. Jackson County Collections Dep't, 36 F.3d 53, 56 (8th Cir. 1994)
(citing Angarita v. St. Louis County, 981 F.2d 1537, 1547 (8th Cir. 1992)).
144. Jett. v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). Compare Wolfe v.
Fayetteville Ark. Sch. Dist., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1019 (W.D. Ark. 2009) (noting that a
school board is the entity possessing final policymaking authority for the school district) with
Lewis v. Thomason, No. 07-6033 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 20, 2009) (finding that a chief of police
for a city of the second class in the State of Arkansas is not a final policymaker).
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titutional custom exists so as to hold a city, county, or political subdivision
liable. 45 Plaintiffs are required to show:
(1) the existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of un-
constitutional misconduct by the governmental entity's employees; (2)
deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the
governmental entity's policymaking officials after notice to the officials
of that misconduct; and (3) that the plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant
to the governmental entity's custom, i.e., that the custom was the moving
force behind the constitutional violation. 1
46
An isolated violation by one who is not a final policymaker is insuffi-
cient to establish a municipal policy or custom. 147 In Deitsch v. Tillery, the
Arkansas Supreme Court held that allegations against a school district and
the school board members that they had repeatedly ignored regulations re-
garding the proper handling of asbestos allegedly leading to the aggravation
of asbestos tiles, failed to state a "custom" such as the appellees could be
held liable under a civil rights claim.
48
Recently, in Gentry v. Robinson, the Arkansas Supreme Court ex-
amined two other theories which a Plaintiff may allege to sue an entity. A
plaintiff may assert that an entity's failure to train employees has led to a
constitutional violation and in some instances bind the entity to liability. 49
Finally, the Court discussed the plaintiffs claim that a county made an in-
adequate hiring decision that led to her alleged constitutional violation. The
Court noted that, as compared to a failure-to-train claim, where "the claim is
145. See Ryan v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 96 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir. 1996).
146. Id. at 1084.
147. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985) (plurality).
148. 309 Ark. 401, 410, 833 S.W.2d 760, 764 (1992). The court noted that a "custom" is
defined as a "habitual way of behaving" or "usual practice." Id. at 410, 833 S.W.2d at 764
(quoting WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1984)). In Gentry v. Robinson, the
court noted a single allegation of rape by a jailer, against a county, failed to create an issue of
fact to preclude summary judgment on a "custom" theory. 2009 Ark. 634, __ S.W.3d __
(Dec. 17, 2009).
149. Gentry v. Robinson, 2009 Ark. 634, S.W.3d (Dec. 17, 2009). There, the court
adopted the following standards regarding a failure-to-train claim:
In a situation where a municipality has a training program for numerous
employees that, over a period of time, results in constitutional violations,
municipalities could 'be put on notice that a new program is called for.
Their continued adherence to an approach that they know or should know
has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the
conscious disregard for the consequences of their action-the 'deliberate
indifference'-necessary to trigger municipal liability.
Id. (quoting Bd. Of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
407 (1997)).
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that a municipality made an individual hiring decision [that has allegedly led
to a constitutional violation], the burden on the plaintiff is much higher."' 50
V. DUE PROCESS
The ARCA provides an individual a means to redress the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Arkansas Constitu-
tion.15' "[Article II, section 2], of the Arkansas Constitution of 1874 pro-
vides in part that '[a]ll men are created equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are those of
enjoying and defending life and liberty[.]"", 15 2 "[Article II, section 8], of the
Arkansas Constitution guarantees that no person shall be 'deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law."" 53 This section includes
discussion of the Arkansas cases considering due process claims brought
pursuant to the ACRA.
A. Duty to Protect
In Shepherd v. Washington County, the Arkansas Supreme Court first
addressed the issue of whether a state actor owed a duty to protect the plain-
tiffs from harm by a third person in an action brought pursuant to the ACRA
for alleged due process violations.154 The court went on to decide what stan-
dard of conduct applied once a duty of care was found to exist.'55
The court adopted the following facts from the complaint. Plaintiff
Peggy Sue Shepherd brought the action personally and as administratrix of
150. Id. The court noted that such a high standard was necessary because "every injury
suffered at the hands of a municipal employee can be traced to a hiring decision in a 'but-for'
sense," but that was not sufficient to create liability for the entity. Rather, the court found the
Plaintiff was required to allege and put forth sufficient facts demonstrating that "the munici-
pal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action." For liability to poten-
tially attach, the court must find that the hiring decision disclosed to the individual responsi-
ble for hiring for the entity "that this officer was highly likely to inflict the particular injury
suffered by the plaintiff." Id. There, despite the Plaintiffs affidavit that the jailer allegedly
responsible for raping her had allegedly inappropriate hugged and kissed a sixteen year old
girl two years before being hired as a jailer, the court found the county and county judge were
not liable on an inadequate hiring theory. Id.
151. ARK. CODEANN. § 16-123-105(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2006).
152. Shepherd v. Washington County, 331 Ark. 480, 499-500, 962 S.W.2d 779, 788
(1998) (quoting ARK. CONST. art. II, § 2).
153. Id. at 500, 962 S.W.2d at 788 (quoting ARK. CONST. art. H, § 8).
154. Id. at 490, 962 S.W.2d at 783. Ordinarily, "duty" is a concept employed in negli-
gence cases which cannot bind a government or government official to liability. See Desha-
ney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989). "Duty to protect"
cases represent a limited line of cases where the concept of a "duty" may apply in civil rights
litigation. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1992).
155. Shepherd, 331 Ark. at 490, 962 S.W.2d at 783.
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the estate of George Shepherd. 5 6 On November 7, 1995, an inmate of the
Washington County jail was taken by Washington County Deputy Pete Wil-
liamson to a private medical clinic for medical treatment.'57 While at the
clinic, in an attempt to escape, the inmate disarmed, shot, and killed Deputy
Williamson.'58 As the inmate attempted to leave the clinic, he attempted to
take Peggy Shepherd hostage. 59 Mrs. Shepherd's husband, George Shephe-
rd, was shot and killed by the inmate when Mr. Shepherd attempted to inter-
vene." ° The inmate stole and wrecked the Shepherd's truck while attempt-
ing to flee. 6' Ultimately, the inmate turned the gun on himself and commit-
ted suicide before he could be taken back into custody.
1 62
One day preceding the incident at the medical clinic, Deputy William-
son had taken the same inmate to the hospital emergency room after the
inmate had been injured in a fight. 63 During the emergency room visit,
while Deputy Williamson was being relieved by another deputy, the inmate
attempted to escape." Later, the inmate talked of committing suicide by
shooting himself. 65 When the inmate and deputy returned to the jail, the
deputy informed his supervisors that the inmate was a flight risk and that the
inmate should not be escorted by only one deputy.
66
Based on these facts, the court first considered whether the defendants
owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs. 167 The court turned to federal case deci-
sions for guidance.'68
During a significant portion of the opinion, the court reviewed various
federal opinions detailing the evolution of the civil rights claims and liability
pursuant to section 1983.69 At the end of the discussion, the court provided
156. Id. at 485, 962 S.W.2d at 780.
157. Id. at 486, 962 S.W.2d at 780.
158. Id. at 486, 962 S.W.2d at 780.
159. Id. at 486, 962 S.W.2d at 780.
160. Id. at 486, 962 S.W.2d at 780.
161. Shepherd, 331 Ark. at 486, 962 S.W.2d at 780.
162. Id. at 486, 962 S.W.2d at 780.
163. Id. at 489, 962 S.W.2d at 782.
164. Id. at 489, 962 S.W.2d at 782.
165. Id. at 489, 962 S.W.2d at 782.
166. Id. at 489-90, 962 S.W.2d at 782.
167. Shepherd, 331 Ark. at 490, 962 S.W.2d at 783.
168. Id. at 490, 962 S.W.2d at 783.
169. Id. at 491-98, 962 S.W.2d at 783-87 (citing Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277
(1980); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945); Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348 (1 1th Cir. 1989); Wells v. Walk-
er, 852 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1988); Nishiyama v. Dickson County, 814 F.2d 277 (6th Cir.
1987); Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714 (1st Cir. 1986); Wright v. City of Ozark,
715 F.2d 1513, 1515 (11 th Cir. 1983); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982)).
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a convenient synopsis of the portions of the federal decisions the court
deemed relevant before rendering its decision.'
Specifically, the court relied upon Bowers v. DeVito'7' when it warned
"that even though the state action was not the direct cause of the deprivation
of the individual's rights, where the state puts an individual in a position of
danger from the acts of a third party, the state may be liable under section
1983. ''172 In considering the ACRA, the court recognized:
[T]wo situations in which the state could be held liable under section
1983 for the deprivation of an individual's civil rights by a third party:
(1) where the state has assumed a 'special custodial or other relationship'
with respect to the individual or (2) where the state has affirmatively
placed an individual in a place of danger from third parties.
173
The court also relied upon federal findings that an individual does not
have to be personally known to the state actors; rather, "the fact that he or
she is part of an identifiable group of potential victims satisfies the require-
ment under the due process clause that there be a deprivation of a particular
individual's rights."'7 4 Moreover, the court noted the importance of deciding
whether an inmate was in the custody and control of the state defendants at
the time the harmful action was committed. 175 Finally, the court looked back
to previous state law decision and recognized, "[t]his court has often stated
that ordinarily one is not liable for the acts of another party unless a special
relationship exists between the tortfeasor and the victim."'76
When the court applied the facts as alleged in the Shepherd complaint,
the court concluded that the county defendants relocated the "custodial envi-
ronment" from the "secured confines of the jail" to an unsecured private
medical clinic. 7 7 The court found that the relocation supported a finding
between the county defendants and the Shepherds sufficient to establish a
duty to protect the Shepherds from the violent actions committed by the
170. Shepherd, 331 Ark. at 497-99, 962 S.W.2d at 786-87.
171. 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1992).
172. Shepherd, 331 Ark. at 498, 962 S.W.2d at 787 (citing Bowers, 686 F.2d at 616).
173. Id. at 498, 962 S.W.2d at 787 (quoting Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714
(1st Cir. 1996)). These are referred to as the "special relationship" and the "state-created
danger" doctrines, respectively.
174. Id. at 498, 962 S.W.2d at 787 (citing Nishiyama v. Dickson County, 814 F.2d 277
(6th Cir. 1987)).
175. Id. at 498, 962 S.W.2d at 787 (citing Nishiyama, 814 F.2d at 277).
176. Id. at 499, 962 S.W.2d at 787 (citing First Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Eng'g,
Inc., 321 Ark. 210, 900 S.W.2d 202 (1995); Bartley v. Sweetser, 319 Ark. 117, 890 S.W.2d
250 (1994); Keck v. Am. Employment Agency, Inc., 279 Ark. 294, 652 S.W.2d 2 (1983). See
also Smith v. Hansen, 323 Ark. 188, 196, 914 S.W.2d 285, 289 (1996) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965)).
177. Shepherd, 331 Ark. at 501, 962 S.W.2d at 788.
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inmate. 78 The court also noted that even though the Shepherds were not
known personally by the defendants, the Shepherds were part of an "identi-
fiable group of potential victims of which [defendants] were aware."' 79
Once the court determined that the defendants owed a duty to protect
the Shepherds, the court moved to a discussion of the appropriate standard
of conduct that a plaintiff must demonstrate on the part of a defendant to
hold the defendant liable. 80 The Shepherds argued that the appropriate stan-
dard of conduct should have been "gross negligence," while the defendants
asserted that the federal standard of "deliberate indifference" should be
adopted.18' Rather than adopt either of these standards, the court decided to
craft a new standard.' 2 Before stating the new standard, the court recog-
nized that negligence was not enough to implicate the Due Process
Clause.1 83 The court recognized that the federal standard of care required
that the "official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must
also draw the inference."' 84 However, after recognizing the standard, the
court stated "we do not agree that such standard of conduct is appropriate
under our State's civil rights law."'8 5
Instead, the court applied the standard of "conscious indifference." '186
The court relied on previous state law decisions for a standard of conscious
indifference:
[I]n order to show that a defendant acted with conscious indifference, it
must appear that he knew or had reason to believe that his actions were
about to inflict injury, and that he continued in his course with a con-
scious indifference to the consequences of his actions, from which ma-
lice may be inferred.
18 7
"Such a disposition or mental state is shown by a person, when, not-
withstanding his conscious and timely knowledge of an approach to an un-
178. Id. at 501, 962 S.W.2d at 788.
179. Id. at 501, 962 S.W.2d at 788.
180. Id. at 501, 962 S.W.2d at 789. The portion of the Shepherd decision regarding the
appropriate standard of conduct is later limited to the specific facts of the Shepherd decision
in Grayson v. Ross, 369 Ark. 241, 253 S.W.3d 428 (2007).
181. Shepherd, 331 Ark. at 502, 962 S.W.2d at 789.
182. Id. at 502, 962 S.W.2d at 789.
183. Id. at 502-03, 962 S.W.2d at 789 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986);
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986)). Presumably, the same is true under the
Arkansas Constitution in a claim brought under the ACRA.
184. Id. at 503, 962 S.W.2d at 790 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)).
185. Id. at 503, 962 S.W.2d at 790.
186. Id. at 503, 962 S.W.2d at 790.
187. Shepherd, 331 Ark. at 504, 962 S.W.2d at 790 (citing Freeman v. Anderson, 279
Ark. 282, 651 S.W.2d 450 (1983)).
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usual danger and of common probability of injury to others, he proceeds into
the presence of danger, with indifference to consequences and with absence
of care."' 88 The court specifically stated that it was "not necessary to prove
that the defendant deliberately intended to injure the plaintiff."'89
[I]n order to demonstrate that a defendant acted with conscious indiffe-
rence, a plaintiff must show that the defendant 'knew or ought to have
known, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, that his conduct
would naturally or probably result in injury and that he continued such
conduct in the reckless disregard of the consequences from which malice
can be inferred.190
Applying the conscious indifference standard to the facts alleged, the
court found that the plaintiffs pleadings were sufficient to support a show-
ing that the defendants acted with "conscious indifference to the probable
consequences of their actions or inactions in handling [the inmate] at the
clinic."' 9 ' In reaching this conclusion, the court specifically considered the
allegations that defendants:
[K]new [the inmate] had violent tendencies, had previously attempted to
escape custody, had fought with other inmates and jailers, had intention-
ally injured himself on two separate occasions, had attempted to commit
suicide in his jail cell, and had talked about committing suicide by shoot-
ing himself the day before the incident in question.' 
92
The defendants' argument that the "complaint failed to allege actual
knowledge of [the inmate's] violent tendencies on the part of the sheriff'
failed. 9 3 Ultimately, the court reversed the trial court's decision and re-
manded the issues for further proceedings. 1
94
The next case addressing the duty to protect issue was Rudd v. Pulaski
County Special School District.'95 In Rudd, the court reported the following
facts. Allegedly, a student at Jacksonville High School, referred to as W.J.
throughout the opinion, brought a handgun to school, stored it in his locker,
and shot and killed another student on the bus ride home from school. 196
188. Id. at 504, 962 S.W.2d at 790 (citing Nat'l By-Products, Inc. v. Search House Mov-
ing Co., 292 Ark. 491, 493-94, 731 S.W.2d 194, 195-96 (1987)).
189. Id. at 504, 962 S.W.2d at 790 (quoting Nat'l By-Products, 292 Ark. at 493-94, 731
S.W.2d at 195-96).
190. Id. at 504, 962 S.W.2d at 790 (quoting Stein v. Lukas, 308 Ark. 74, 78, 823 S.W.2d
832, 834 (1992)).
191. Id. at 504-05, 962 S.W.2d at 790.
192. Id. at 505, 962 S.W.2d at 790.
193. Shepherd, 351 Ark. at 505, 962 S.W.2d at 791.
194. Id. at 505, 962 S.W.2d at 791.
195. 341 Ark. 794, 20 S.W.3d 310 (2000).
196. Id. at 796,20 S.W.3d at 312.
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According to the court, W.J. and the student he shot had previously had fre-
quent confrontations, and the bus driver had admonished both students.'97
During the preceding year, W.J. attended Sylvan Hills Junior High School
where his discipline record included "expulsion from school for bringing a
knife to school and assaulting another student with that knife on a school
bus ... fighting in class; disorderly conduct; roughhousing in class; being a
member of a gang that had violent initiation rites; and persistent disregard
for the school rules and authority."' 98 Joe Rudd brought suit personally and
as administrator of the Estate of Earl Jameson Routt, the deceased student,
asserting theories of liability under the ACRA and for negligence.199 The
case went to the Arkansas Supreme Court on appeal after a trial court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.200
After reviewing the language of the ACRA, the Shepherd decision, and
the federal cases reviewed in Shepherd, the court found the circumstances in
Rudd distinguishable from those in Shepherd.2"' According to the Rudd
court, in Shepherd there existed a custodial relationship between the inmate
and the state actor which imposed a duty upon the state actor "to protect
third persons from injury inflicted by the inmate who escaped from custo-
dy. '202 The court found the relationship between a bus driver and student to
be significantly different than the relationship between a prisoner and his
warden.2 3 Specifically, the court found that neither the school district nor
the driver had "police authority to deprive W.J. of his liberty by placing
physical restraints upon his actions."2" The court stated further that "[w]hile
schools should foster a sense of safety for students in order to provide an
environment in which students can learn, school officials should not be
placed in a position where enforcing physical restraints takes precedence
over their primary purpose of teaching and carrying out administrative du-
ties., 205 The court held that W.J., the assailant, was not a state actor, and that
the "school district's failure to impose and maintain restraints upon him did
not trigger the provisions of the ACRA. 2 °6 Thus, the claim failed under the
"state-created danger" doctrine.
197. Id. at 796, 20 S.W.3d at 311.
198. Id. at 796, 20 S.W.3d at 311.
199. Id. at 795, 20 S.W.3d at 311. While the court discussed the facts of Shepherd in
detail, the Rudd decision does not mention what turns out to be the most controversial issue
in Shepherd, i.e., "the conscious indifference standard." In fact, the court's conclusion that no
duty existed prevented the court from discussing the appropriate standard of care.
200. Id. at 796, 20 S.W.3d at 311.
201. Rudd, 341 Ark. at 797-99, 20 S.W.3d at 312-13.
202. Id. at 799, 20 S.W.3d at 313.
203. Id. at 799, 20 S.W.3d at 313.
204. Id. at 799, 20 S.W.3d at313.
205. Id. at 799, 20 S.W.3d at 313.
206. Id. at 799-800, 20 S.W.3d at 313-14.
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The court then considered the issue of whether the school had a special
relationship with the victim that imposed a duty to protect the victim from
violent acts pursuant to the ACRA. 2 7 The court turned to federal case law,
and noted that the United States Supreme Court had not "extended the duty
of protection beyond the cases of incarcerated prisoners and involuntarily
committed mental patients. 2 °8
The court recognized and rejected the plaintiffs contention that the
Jacksonville High School officials should have prevented the victim from
being placed in a dangerous position based upon W.J.'s alleged violent his-
tory at Sylvan Hills Junior High School. 0 9 In part, the court relied upon the
lack of evidence of any similar behavior while W.J. was enrolled at Jack-
sonville High School.210 The court concluded that no special relationship
existed between the school and the victim that would impose a duty on the
state to protect the victim pursuant to the ACRA.21
B. Inmate Lawsuits
The Arkansas Supreme Court first addressed what is known as a "deni-
al of medical care" claim in Williams v. Arkansas Department of Correc-
tions.2 Williams alleged that he was denied prescribed medical care after
he was provided a wool blanket with sheets sewn over it rather than a non-
wool blanket as he alleged he was prescribed.213
To determine whether Williams had pled sufficient facts to establish a
finding of a constitutional violation, the court first turned to Estelle v. Gam-
ble,2"4 for the proposition that a violation of the Eighth Amendment right to
be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated where there was
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.2"5 The court
then recognized that in Shepherd it had previously rejected the federal stan-
dard of deliberate indifference for cases arising out of the ACRA and in-
stead had accepted the standard of conscious indifference. 26 The court then
207. Rudd, 341 Ark. at 800,20 S.W.3d at 314.
208. Id. at 801, 20 S.W.3d at 314 (citing Dorothy v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 794 F. Supp.
1405 (E.D. Ark. 1992)).
209. Id. at 801, 20 S.W.3d at 314-15.
210. Id. at 801, 20 S.W.3d at 315.
211. Id. at 801, 20 S.W.3d at 315.
212. 362 Ark. 134, 207 S.W.3d 519 (2005).
213. Id. at 136, 207 S.W.3d at 521.
214. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
215. Williams, 362 Ark. at 138-39, 207 S.W.3d at 523. The Arkansas Constitution's
analogue to the Eighth Amendment is article II, section 9.
216. Id. at 138-39, 207 S.W.3d at 523 (citing Shepherd v. Washington County, 331 Ark.
480, 962 S.W.2d 779 (1998)). However, despite recognizing the "conscious indifference"
standard, the court ultimately did not reach the issue of whether the defendant violated the
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turned back to federal law and defined a serious medical need as "a condi-
tion that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one
that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessi-
ty for a doctor's attention. ' '217 The court stated further that "[n]ot every ache
and pain or medically recognized condition supports a claim of Eighth
Amendment violation and the claim must involve a substantial risk of se-
rious harm to the inmate. 2t 8
The court held that Williams had not shown a serious medical condi-
tion to support a violation of his rights pursuant to article II, section 9 of the
Arkansas Constitution, because "his condition [was] not one that mandat[ed]
treatment, even though it may have been diagnosed by a doctor., 219 Impor-
tantly, the Arkansas Supreme Court appears to be in lockstep with federal
jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment regarding what constitutes a
"serious medical need" for a claim under the Arkansas Constitution.
In Bayless v. Beck, the Arkansas Supreme Court considered an in-
mate's claims that her due process rights were violated because the discipli-
nary appeals process in the privately owned prison where she was incarce-
rated differed from the disciplinary appeals process utilized in state operated
prisons.220 The plaintiff argued that her constitutional rights had been vi-
olated because the Arkansas Department of Corrections did not provide her
the process provided in its own regulations.22 ' According to the court, the
plaintiff "essentially claimed a liberty interest in having state officers and
those employed by the state follow state law., 222 The court cited federal case
law for the proposition that while the plaintiff "may have a liberty interest in
the nature of her confinement, she does not have a liberty interest in the ac-
tual procedures to be administered. '2 23 The court decided that the plaintiff
did not show that the different procedure was defective, and consequently,
the plaintiff did not show that her substantive due process rights were vi-
olated. 24 The court also referred to federal authority for its conclusion that,
to state a claim for substantive due process, the plaintiff was required to
conscious indifference standard because the court determined that the plaintiff failed to show
a serious medical need. Id. at 140, 207 S.W.3d at 524.
217. Id. at 139, 207 S.W.3d at 523 (citing Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d
890 (6th Cir. 2004); Hunt v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 1999); Mahan v. Plymouth
County House of Corr., 64 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Busby, 953 F.2d 349 (8th Cir.
1991)).
218. Id. at 139-40, 207 S.W.3d at 523-24 (citing Roberson v. Goodman, 293 F. Supp. 2d
1075 (D.N.D. 2003)).
219. Id. at 140, 207 S.W.3d at 524.
220. No. 04-69, 2005 WL 1411656, at *1-2 (Ark. June 16, 2005) (per curiam).
221. Id. at *2.
222. Id.
223. Id. (citing Kennedy v. Blankenship, 100 F.3d 640 (8th Cir. 1996)).
224. Id.
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show "an atypical and substantive deprivation that was a dramatic departure
from the basic conditions of confinement.,
225
In Grayson v. Ross, the Arkansas Supreme Court was called upon to
decide a question certified by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals: "Whether
the conscious indifference standard announced by this court in Shepherd v.
Washington County... affords greater protection to pretrial detainees than
the federal deliberate indifference standard. 226 In Grayson, a pretrial detai-
nee was incarcerated after his arrest for DWI.227 Grayson "died in jail within
hours of his arrest as a result of methamphetamine intoxication and physical
struggle, with idiopathic cardiomyopathy as a contributing condition.
228
The lawsuit was originally filed in federal court, and two defendants
went to trial after the balance of the defendants were dismissed on summary
judgment.29 The jury returned in favor of the defendants and the plaintiff
appealed in part asserting that the jury was improperly instructed on the
appropriate standard under the ACRA. 23° The plaintiff argued that the jury
should have been instructed on the conscious indifference standard rather
than the federal standard of deliberate indifference.231 The Eighth Circuit
affirmed the trial court on all other points and held the decision on this point
in abeyance pending the court's response to the certified question.232
In consideration of the certified question, the court first examined fed-
eral case law and recognized that "the Eighth Amendment's proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment does not apply to pretrial detai-
nees." 233 However, the court concluded that because the due process rights
of pretrial detainees are "at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protec-
tions available to a convicted prisoner," '234 federal courts had applied the
"deliberate-indifference standard to claims by pretrial detainees that their
serious medical needs have been ignored or that state officials have failed to
protect them from a serious risk of harm.,
235
225. Id. The court also noted that because "meritorious good time" does not apply in
Arkansas to reduce the length of a sentence, Arkansas has not created a liberty interest in
"meritorious good time." Id. (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)).
226. 369 Ark. 241, 242-43, 253 S.W.3d 428, 429-30 (2007).
227. Id. at 242, 253 S.W.3d at 429.
228. Id. at 242, 253 S.W.3d at 429.
229. Id. at 242-43, 253 S.W.3d at 429.
230. Id. at 243, 253 S.W.3d at 429.
231. Id. at 243, 253 S.W.3d at 429.
232. Grayson, 369 Ark. at 243, 253 S.W.3d at 429.
233. Id. at 245, 253 S.W.3d at 431 (citing City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S.
239 (1983)).
234. Id. at 245, 253 S.W.3d at 431 (quoting City of Revere, 463 U.S. at 244).




The court next examined Shepherd v. Washington County23 6 and noted
that decision involved neither a pretrial detainee nor any unmet medical
needs. 237 Next, the court dissected Williams v. Arkansas Department of Cor-
238rections, and determined that although the Shepherd conscious indiffe-
rence standard was mentioned in the Williams decision, the Williams deci-
sion did not apply the standard because the court found that the "inmate did
not establish that he had a serious medical need., 239 The court found that
"the use of the conscious-indifference standard is limited to the facts of the
Shepherd case," and overruled Williams to the extent that it can be inter-
preted as holding that the conscious indifference standard is appropriate for
all inmate claims brought under the ACRA. 24" Finally, because the court
adopted deliberate indifference as the proper standard, the court found no
need to answer the specific question certified by the Eighth Circuit.
241
C. Property Interests
There is scarce precedent in Arkansas regarding property rights and
due process under the ACRA. However, at least two cases have discussed
the issue. In Robinson v. Langdon, the court reported the following facts. A
houseparent at a residential children's center was placed in the registry of
child abusers that was maintained by the Department of Human Services.242
The houseparent appealed the decision and his name was ultimately re-
moved from the registry.243 The houseparent then filed suit pursuant to the
ACRA.2' Although the bulk of the opinion was decided on immunity
grounds,245 the court briefly recognized that "the law does not support a
claim that potential injury to reputation constitutes a deprivation of a proper-
ty interest.""
The court again addressed due process as it relates to property rights in
Ingram v. City of Pine Bluff.247 There, Ingram brought suit based in part on a
236. 331 Ark. 480, 962 S.W.2d 779 (1988).
237. Grayson, 369 Ark. at 247, 253 S.W.3d at 432.
238. 362 Ark. 134, 207 S.W.3d 519 (2005).
239. Grayson, 369 Ark. at 248, 253 S.W.3d at 433.
240. Id. at 248, 253 S.W.3d at 433.
241. Id. at 249, 253 S.W.3d at 433-34.
242. 333 Ark. 662, 665, 970 S.W.2d 292, 293 (1998).
243. Id. at 665, 970 S.W.2d at 293-94.
244. Id. at 665, 970 S.W.2d at 294.
245. Id. at 667-72, 970 S.W.2d at 294-97.
246. Id. at 671-72, 970 S.W.2d at 297 (citing Ark. Dep't of Human Services v. Heath,
312 Ark. 206, 848 S.W.2d 927 (1993)).
247. 335 Ark. 129, 133 S.W.3d 382 (2003).
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claim of denial of due process pursuant to the ACRA after the city of Pine
Bluff passed a resolution and ultimately demolished his rental property. 48
In March of 1997, Ingram was notified that the Pine Bluff City Council
would be considering the potential demolition of his rental property during a
city council meeting."' Through his agent, Ingram contacted a city council
member who stated that he would have. Ingram's property removed from
consideration, and that there was no need for Ingram to appear at the meet-
ing.250 Neither Ingram nor his agent went to the meeting, and the council
member did not have the matter removed from consideration.25' The council
passed a resolution to raze the property, and gave Mr. Ingram ten days to
raze the building. 2 Neither the council member nor the city of Pine Bluff
notified Ingram or his agent of the resolution. 3 The city demolished the
house approximately four months later.254
Ingram claimed that he was denied due process because the city never
gave him notice of its decision to demolish his house after the city council
meeting.255 However, the court found that it was undisputed that Ingram did
receive notice of the meeting, which neither he nor his agent attended. 56
The court agreed with the defendant's argument that "due process does
not require notice of intent to abate the nuisance after the city council meet-
ing. '2 57 The court quoted federal precedent, stating "[w]here a property
owner is given written notice to abate a hazard on his property and has been
given an opportunity to appear before the proper municipal body consider-
ing condemnation of the property, no due process violation occurs when the
municipality abates the nuisance pursuant to the condemnation notice. 258
The court stated that "Mr. Ingram had an opportunity to be heard at a mea-
ningful time in a meaning manner., 259 The court adopted federal rationale,
concluding that "[d]ue process does not require additional opportunities to
abate nuisances or to meet with city officials after the notice and hearing
248. Id. at 132, 133 S.W.3d at 383-84. The suit was originally brought in federal court,
but the case returned to state court after the federal court ruled that Mr. Ingram had not ex-
hausted his state court remedies. Id. at 132-33, 133 S.W.3d at 384.
249. Id. at 132, 133 S.W.3d at 384.
250. Id. at 132, 133 S.W.3d at 384.
251. Id. at 132, 133 S.W.3d at 384.
252. Id. at 132, 133 S.W.3d at 384.
253. Ingram, 355 Ark. at 132, 133 S.W.3d at 384.
254. Id. at 132, 133 S.W.3d at 384.
255. Id. at 135, 133 S.W.3d at 386.
256. Id. at 135, 133 S.W.3d at 386.
257. Id. at 135, 133 S.W.3d at 386.
258. Id. at 136, 133 S.W.3d at 386 (quoting Samuels v. Meriwether, 94 F.3d 1163, 1166-
67 (8th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted)).
259. Ingram, 355 Ark. at 136, 133 S.W.3d at 386.
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have been provided., 26" The court upheld the trial court's dismissal of In-
gram's due process claims.261
VI. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The Arkansas Supreme Court has addressed a few cases involving ar-
ticle II, section 15 of the Arkansas Constitution which protects the citizenry
of Arkansas from unreasonable searches and seizures. This section will dis-
cuss where the Arkansas courts have addressed the differences between their
interpretation of the Arkansas Constitution and federal court interpretations
of the Fourth Amendment.
A. Rainey v. Hartness
In 1999, the Arkansas Supreme Court rendered a decision in Rainey v.
Hartness.262 Appellants Rainey and Harton filed suit against appellee Hart-
ness, a wildlife enforcement officer employed by the Arkansas Game and
Fish Commission, an entity of state government. 263 The appellants claimed
that Hartness had entered their property unlawfully, seized appellant Har-
ton's rifle "through an illegal search," converted the rifle "without due
process of law and just compensation," and damaged their crops.2 4
In Rainey, the appellants were hunting deer on wooded land "owned by
Rainey and leased by Harton. ' '265 James Hartness, who was on patrol at the
time, noticed two unattended vehicles on Rainey's land, leading him to the
conclusion that people were hunting on the land.266 Hartness entered the
property and first encountered Rainey.267 According to the opinion, upon
request by Hartness, Rainey produced a hunting license belonging to some-
260. Id. at 136, 133 S.W.3d at 386 (citing Samuels, 94 F.3d at 1167).
261. Id. at 136, 133 S.W.3d at 386.
262. 339 Ark. 293, 5 S.W.3d 410 (1999).
263. Id. at 296, 5 S.W.3d at 413. The suit named Hartness in his capacity as a wildlife
officer for Grant County. Had the issue been presented, it is likely the court would have con-
strued the suit as a suit against the State of Arkansas only because the appellants did not sue
Hartness expressly in his individual capacity. See Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172
F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999) ("[I]n order to sue a public official in his or her individual
capacity, a plaintiff must expressly and unambiguously state so in the pleadings, otherwise, it
will be assumed that the defendant is sued only in his or her official capacity."); Egerdahl v.
Hibbing Community College, 72 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 1995). However, the capacity issue was
not presented in this case.
264. Rainey, 339 Ark. at 296, 5 S.W.3d at 413.
265. Id. at 296, 5 S.W.3d at 413.
266. Id. at 296, 5 S.W.3d at 413.
267. Id. at 296, 5 S.W.3d at 413.
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one else.268 Hartness wrote Rainey a citation for violating a regulation pro-
hibiting the possession of the hunting license of another.
269
Hartness then found Harton at a second location on the property. 27° The
court noted that Harton climbed down from his deer stand and approached
Hartness-rather than waiting for Hartness to first approach him-and pro-
duced his muzzleloader license. 27' According to Hartness, this behavior was
unusual.2 72 Given Harton's unusual behavior, Hartness climbed the deer
stand where he found a rifle.273 The deer season at the time was only open
for hunting by muzzleloader, not modem guns, so Hartness issued Harton a
citation for hunting with an improper weapon.274
Both men were convicted, but only Harton appealed his conviction.275
During Harton's appeal, the State dismissed the prosecution.276 Neverthe-
268. Id. at 296, 5 S.W.3d at 413.
269. Id. at 296, 5 S.W.3d at 413.
270. Rainey, 339 Ark. at 297, 5 S.W.3d at 413.
271. Id. at 297, 5 S.W.3d at 413.
272. Id. at 297, 5 S.W.3d at 413.
273. Id. at 297, 5 S.W.3d at 413.
274. Id. at 297, 5 S.W.3d at 413.
275. Id. at 297, 5 S.W.3d at 413. Rainey's failure to appeal and successfully overturn his
conviction, had it been argued, would be a defense to the lawsuit under various theories. The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies "to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its
name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judg-
ments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a plaintiffs claims if
"the requested federal relief would void the state court's judgment or amount to basically a
reversal of the state court's holding." Ace Const. v. City of St. Louis, 263 F.3d 831, 833 (8th
Cir. 2001).
While it is true that the doctrine is applied in the context of federal court proceedings, the
doctrine should have no less applicability in the context of a state court civil suit which seeks
to void a state court criminal conviction; indeed, collateral attacks are prohibited. Further-
more, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not mutually exclusive of claim and issue preclusion,
which would also justify its application in the context of this case. Rainey should have been
required to appeal and overturn his conviction before he could collaterally attack the convic-
tion by way of a Civil Rights Act lawsuit. Various justifications exist for this rule, not the
least of which is claim preclusion based on arguments presented and litigated in the criminal
prosecution, i.e., whether or not the Arkansas Constitution was violated by the actions of
Hartness which might justify suppression of crucial prosecution evidence.
Another similar defense is based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), where the Court held that:
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or impri-
sonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid, a [section 1983] plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by execu-
tive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determi-
nation, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
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less, allegedly upon instruction of the deputy prosecuting attorney, Hartness
retained possession of Harton's gun.277 The gun was later returned in good
condition, but not before the appellants brought the aforementioned claims
under both the federal and state civil rights acts.278
The court addressed the case under both section 1983 and the ACRA.279
The court noted that, before it would undertake a review of the substance of
appellants' claims, it first was required to address the defense of qualified
immunity interposed by Hartness. 28' The court stated:
Generally, government officials performing discretionary functions are
granted a qualified immunity from suit under section 1983 and are
'shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.' Courts evaluating a claim of
immunity must determine whether the plaintiff alleged the deprivation of
an actual constitutional right and, if so, whether that right was clearly es-
tablished at the time of the alleged violation.2 l
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (emphasis added).
276. Rainey, 339 Ark. at 297, 5 S.W.3d at 413.
277. Id. at 297, 5 S.W.3d at 413.
278. Id. at 297, 5 S.W.3d at 413-14. Based on the inclusion of the appellants' claims
under section 1983, Hartness was entitled to remove the case to federal court; however, there
is no indication in the procedural history of whether this was attempted.
279. Id. at 299, 5 S.W.3d at 415. The Appellant's first claimed, as Harton had successful-
ly claimed on appeal of his conviction, that Hartness was not an elected wildlife enforcement
officer as required by amendment 35 to the Arkansas Constitution. Id. at 297-98, 5 S.W.3d at
413-14. Interestingly, this argument potentially belies the Appellants' claims under both
Acts. Appellants would have been required to prove as an essential element of the claims,
under either Act, that Hartness acted under color of state law when he allegedly violated their
constitutional rights. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1988); see also ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-123-105(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2006) ("Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of this state or any of its political subdivisions sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Arkansas Constitution shall be liable
to the party injured in an action in circuit court for legal and equitable relief or other proper
redress.") (emphasis added). If Hartness was not properly elected and, as the trial court found,
"was not authorized to issue citations for Game and Fish violations," then Hartness could
have argued that he did not act under color of state law and the claims should have failed
pursuant to ARK. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rainey, 339 Ark. at 298, 5 S.W.3d at 414. The Arkansas
Supreme Court noted that the Game and Fish Commission did elect Hartness, but that their
meeting minutes ten months prior to the citations issued by Hartness failed to recognize this
election. Id. at 298, 5 S.W.3d at 414. Consequently, the court held that the undisputed facts
demonstrated Hartness was elected and the appellants' claim regarding amendment 35 was
properly adjudicated on summary judgment in favor of Hartness. Id. at 298-99, 5 S.W.3d at
414.
280. Rainey, 339 Ark. at 299, 5 S.W.3d at 415.
281. Id. at 299, 5 S.W.3d at 415 (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999)).
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The issue of whether the official's conduct violated clearly established
constitutional rights is a question of law that may be resolved by summary
judgment.
282
The court then discussed the claims brought by the appellants under the
Fourth Amendment relating to Hartness's entry onto the land and search of
the deer stand.283 The court found that the "open fields" doctrine applied-
which is an exception to the requirement that an officer possess a warrant
for either a search or seizure. 284 The court said, "protection afforded by the
Fourth Amendment does not extend to open fields or lands., 285 Therefore,
the court held that the entry onto open land did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.28 6
The court also held that Harton did not possess a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the deer stand because, even if he subjectively had an expecta-
tion of privacy, it was not an objectively reasonable one.287 The court noted
that the deer stand was essentially a "metal box, with sides three to four feet
high and a roof elevated on poles at each comer of the box., 288 Because the
stand was crude, open, functionally accessible to others, and because no
private activities of consequence occurred in the stand, the court found that
Harton's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated due to the lack of a
legitimate expectation of privacy.289 Consequently, under the first prong of
the qualified immunity analysis, the trial court's grant of summary judgment
was affirmed as the appellants failed to demonstrate the violation of any
constitutional right.29°
282. Id. at 299-300, 5 S.W.3d at 415.
283. Id. at 300, 5 S.W.3d at 415.
284. Id. at 300, 5 S.W.3d at 415 (citing Sanders v. State, 264 Ark. 433, 572 S.W.2d 397
(1978); see also ARK. R. CRIM. P. 14.2 (stating at the time of decision: "An officer may,
without a search warrant, search open lands and seize things which he reasonably believes
subject to seizure.").
285. Rainey, 339 Ark. at 300, 5 S.W.3d at 415 (citing United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S.
294 (1987)).
286. Id. at 300, 5 S.W.3d at 416.
287. Id. at 301, 5 S.W.3d at 416.
288. Id. at 301, 5 S.W.3d at 416.
289. See id. at 301-02, 5 S.W.3d at 416-17.
290. Id. at 302-03, 5 S.W.3d at 417. The court briefly addressed the takings claim and
held that Hartness was lawfully present and observed the rifle which was evidence of a viola-
tion subject to seizure under ARK. R. CRIM. P. 10.2. Id. at 302-03, 5 S.W.3d at 417. The ap-
pellants' claim regarding the rifle was brought under the takings clause of the Arkansas Con-
stitution and the due process clause. Based on interpretation of the United States Constitution,
Hartness would have also had the defense that Harton failed to first unsuccessfully seek re-
dress for the deprivation under an available state remedy other than the ACRA. Indeed, ARK.
R. CRIM. P. 15.2 grants post-deprivation due process by allowing for a criminal defendant to
move for the return of the property. Ali v. Ramsdell, 423 F.3d 810, 814 (8th Cir. 2005) (quot-
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The court next addressed the appellants' claims under state law involv-
ing the damage to Rainey's crops.291' The court discussed section 19-10-305
of the Arkansas Code, which affords statutory immunity from suit for al-
leged damages caused by state officials (a) who are acting within the course
and scope of their employment, (b) who are not alleged to have acted mali-
ciously, and (c) to the extent they are not covered by liability insurance for
such nonmalicious acts.292 Since the appellants did not allege that Hartness
had acted maliciously or had liability insurance, the court found that Hart-
ness was entitled to statutory immunity from the appellants' state law con-
version claim.293
Most interestingly, the court held that article II, section 15 of the Ar-
kansas Constitution was "virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment" and
that it would interpret the state provision "in the same manner" as the United
States Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment.294 However, Rai-
ney is likely abrogated or partially modified on this point given the court's
later decisions in State v. Sullivan and State v. Brown.295
B. City of Farmington v. Smith
In City ofFarmington v. Smith, the Arkansas Supreme Court was again
presented with a suit brought, inter alia, under article II, section 15 of the
Arkansas Constitution by and through the ACRA.296 Smith, an employee of
the city, brought suit challenging a police entry into her home.297
ing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 539 (1984) ("'[I]n challenging a property deprivation
[under the Fourth Amendment or the Due Process Clause], the claimant must either avail
himself of the remedies guaranteed by state law or prove that the available remedies are in-
adequate')). However, the issue does not appear to have been presented in this case.
291. Rainey, 339 Ark. at 303, 5 S.W.3d at 417.
292. Id. at 303, 5 S.W.3d at 417 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-10-305 (LEXIS Repl.
2007)).
293. Id. at 303, 5 S.W.3d at 417.
294. Id. at 300, 5 S.W.3d at 415. But see State v. Sullivan, 348 Ark. 647, 655-56, 74
S.W.3d 215, 220-21 (2002) (holding that article II, section 15 of the Arkansas Constitution
provided greater protection to the citizenry of Arkansas than that provided under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and finding that a pretextual arrest is violative
of that section).
295. Sullivan, 348 Ark. at 655-56, 74 S.W.3d at 220-21; State v. Brown, 356 U.S. 460,
474, 156 S.W.3d 722, 732 (2004) (holding that the Arkansas Constitution provided greater
protection than the Fourth Amendment in the area of knock-and-talk police entries into
homes and requiring officers to inform a home dweller of his or her right to refuse consent as
an absolute prerequisite to the constitutionality of a home entry based on the consent excep-
tion to the warrant requirement).
296. 356 Ark. 473, 479-80, 237 S.W.3d 1, 6 (2006).
297. Id. at 475, 237 S.W.3d at 3. Smith's children allegedly matched the description of
suspects in an armed robbery and the police arrived at Smith's home for the purpose of inves-
tigating that crime. Id. at 474-75, 237 S.W.3d at 3.
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The Arkansas Supreme Court again announced that it would follow the
federal qualified immunity standards in deciding the individual appellants'
claims of immunity from suit.298 In reviewing the claim of immunity, the
court noted its prior decision in State v. Brown, 299 where the court held that
in order for officers to enter a home lawfully, without a warrant, and on the
basis of purported consent of the home-dweller, officer must first inform the
home-dweller of his or her right to refuse consent."l In Smith, the officers
had not informed Smith or the other occupants of the home that they had the
right to refuse consent.3"1
The court found that because the ruling in Brown came down in 2004, a
reasonable officer in the position of the appellants should have known that
entering a home without a warrant, and without informing the home-dweller
of his or her right to refuse consent, would violate the Arkansas Constitu-
tion." 2 Consequently, the court found that the trial court did not err when it
denied qualified immunity to the individual appellants.3"3
VII. OBSERVATIONS
The process used by the Arkansas Supreme Court in interpreting the
Arkansas Constitution by and through the ACRA consistently with the in-
terpretation by the United States Supreme Court of the United States Consti-
tution should be adhered to because it lends predictability to the law and is
justified by the similarity between the two documents.3°4 In Rainey v. Hart-
ness,30 5 the court noted that the text of the state constitutional provision at
issue was virtually identical to that of the United States Constitution, and
consequently, found that the interpretation should proceed in lockstep with
the federal courts' interpretation of the United States Constitution.36 Thus,
where the text of a provision of the Arkansas Constitution is "virtually iden-
tical" to the text of a provision of the federal Constitution,3 7 a court adjudi-
298. Id. at 478-79, 237 S.W.3d at 5. Again, the court noted that in its view, qualified
immunity emanates from section 21-9-301 of the Arkansas Code, rather than the common
law, as it does in federal jurisprudence. Id. at 478, 237 S.W.3d at 5.
299. 356 Ark. 460, 156 S.W.3d 722 (2004).
300. Id. at 480, 237 S.W.3d at 6. Under federal jurisprudence, an officer need not inform
a home-dweller of the right to refuse consent in order for consent to enter the home absent a
warrant to be valid. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
301. Smith, 356 Ark. at 479, 237 S.W.3d at 6.
302. Id. at 480, 237 S.W.3d at 6.
303. Id. at 480, 237 S.W.3d at 6.
304. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV with ARK. CONST. art. XV; compare U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV with ARK. CONST. art. II, § 8.
305. 339 Ark. 293, 5 S.W.3d 410 (1999).
306. See id at 303, 5 S.W.3d at 418.
307. The same rule should apply where the text of the ACRA is virtually identical to a
federal statute such as Title VII.
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cating a claim under the ACRA should look largely to federal decisions un-
der section 1983. Indeed, the issue of qualified immunity as discussed in
Rainey dictates this approach as officials are bound by the "clearly estab-
lished law.
308
While it is true that public officials are required to adhere to the clearly
established law, it is unreasonable to expect such officials to learn, digest,
recognize, and apply divergent bodies of constitutional jurisprudence. Of
course, where our courts have previously given a unique interpretation to
our laws, an official will be bound to know that interpretation, as in City of
Farmington v. Smith.
309
The court has recently limited its departure from federal interpretation
of the United States Constitution in the area of due process under the Arkan-
sas Constitution when, in Grayson v. Ross, it limited its previously an-
nounced standard of "conscious indifference" in favor of the federal stan-
dard of "deliberate indifference." 310 Thus, again, it can be seen that the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court has relied upon the federal courts' interpretation of
the United States Constitution in reviewing cases brought under the ACRA.
Although sixteen years have passed since the enactment of the ACRA,
many questions remain regarding the proper interpretation and application
of the Act. Indeed, the issue of whether an individual may be sued for retali-
ation under the ACRA, as opposed to the just an entity, has resulted in dif-
fering answers in the United States district courts for the two districts in
Arkansas. 311 This issue was once certified to the Arkansas Supreme Court,
but the case was resolved before the court rendered its decision.312 Once
again, a motion has been made in federal court for the issue to be certified to
the Arkansas Supreme Court, and perhaps, the issue will have a final resolu-
tion.313
308. Rainey, 339 Ark. at 299, 5 S.W.3d at 415.
309. 366 Ark. 473,237 S.W.3d 1 (2006).
310. 369 Ark. 241, 249, 253 S.W.3d 428, 433 (2007).
311. Compare Vineyard v. EWI, Inc., No. 02-609 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 16, 2002) (order grant-
ing in part and denying in part a motion to dismiss) (holding that a supervisor may be held
individually liable under the ACRA for retaliation against an employee) with Whitney v.
Unibar Maint. Serv. Inc., No. 04-561 (E.D. Ark. June 23, 2004) (order denying motion to
remand) (holding that a supervisor may not be held individually liable under the ACRA for
retaliation against an employee).
312. See Battles v. Townsend, No. 08-117 (E.D. Ark. May 20, 2008) (order certifying
question).
313. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has said that, in order for a
plaintiff to beat summary judgment on a ACRA retaliation claim, he or she must make the
same showing as is required for a similar claim under Title VII. Wallace v. Sparks Health
Sys., 415 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Island v. Buena Vista Resort, 352 Ark. 548, 103
S.W.3d 671, 676 (2003)). However, the issue of whether an individual may be sued personal-
ly under the ACRA for retaliation was not presented there. Furthermore, the statutes differ in
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Another interesting issue concerns what rights the Arkansas courts are
prepared to recognize as cognizable under the ACRA. For instance, the Ar-
kansas Court of Appeals held, in Carmical v. McAfee, that one does not
have a right to be free from a lawsuit where the lawsuit is based upon prob-
able cause.314 The court appears to have linked its discussion of the state tort
of malicious prosecution into its discussion of the civil rights claim.3" 5 Con-
sequently, the claim failed for the same reason as the malicious prosecution
claim failed, i.e., probable cause existed for the lawsuit.3 16 In any event, the
case foreshadows what might be the next battleground for litigation under
the ACRA: what rights, statutory or constitutional, may be redressed under
the ACRA.
The federal courts have placed various limits on litigation under section
1983. For example, one may not seek redress for the failure to be given Mi-
randa warnings under section 1983, even though those warnings are linked
to the Fifth Amendment.317 Furthermore, equal protection, procedural and
substantive due process, the right to free speech, and the right to petition the
government, are all fertile areas for litigation under the ACRA. In the ab-
sence of a textual or historical justification for unique interpretation, as the
court in Rainey suggested, the courts should largely interpret our laws con-
sistent with the United States Constitution in order to avoid the confusion
that would ensue to public officials applying those laws.
that Title VII proscribes an "employer" from retaliating, while the ACRA prohibits a "per-
son" from retaliating. Consequently the issue is ripe for decision.
314. 68 Ark. App. 313, 327-28, 7 S.W.3d 350, 360 (1999).
315. See id. at 327-28, 7 S.W.3d at 360.
316. See id. at 327-28, 7 S.W.3d at 360.
317. See Weaver v. Brenner, 40 F.3d 527, 534 (2nd Cir. 1994) ("... [T]he failure to read
the warnings does not standing alone give rise to a constitutional violation... [because the
Miranda warnings are merely a prophylactic measure devised to protect one's Fifth Amend-
ment rights].).
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